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Understanding “Spanglish” and 
“Flemch”: A Comparative Analysis of 
American and Belgian Language Politics
Urvashi Wattal
I. Introduction
Globalization has been defined by various scholars, such as David 
Harvey and Ulrich Beck, as a rapid dissemination of information, 
ideas, and even people across the world. The process of globalization is 
witnessed on various platforms, including the economic, the political, 
and the cultural. Under pressure from global forces and institutions, 
the role of traditional nation-states is continuously being challenged. 
A prime example of such a force is the increasing influence of the 
European Union (EU) in shaping domestic policies within its member 
states. Globalization has not only made the world smaller in a techno-
logical sense, it has also highlighted issues of conflict and resurgent 
nationalism, while at the same time furthering the cause of Cosmopoli-
tanism.1
As politics, nations, and cultures change under pressure from glo-
balization, so does the manner in which populations identify them-
selves in relation to these parameters. To address the assigned theme 
of Globalization in Comparative Perspective, I tackle the question of 
linguistic diversity in Belgium and the United States. This study inves-
tigates how language politics and, subsequently, the nationalism that 
it reinforces have been affected by globalization in countries that have 
linguistically diverse populations.
Multilingual societies have been the center of national ethnic con-
flict due to the fact that language diversity not only represents another 
form of diversity, but also alters the ability of people in a specific group 
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to participate completely in civil society and government.2 As Will 
Kymlika and Alan Patten write:
A series of recent events has made it clear that language policy is central 
to many of the traditional themes and concepts of political theory, such 
as democracy, citizenship, nationhood, and the state. The rise of ethno-
linguistic conflict in Eastern Europe, the resurgence of language-based 
secessionist movements in Catalonia, Flanders, and Quebec, the back-
lash against immigrant multiculturalism, and the difficulties in building 
a pan-European sense of European Union citizenship—in all of these 
cases, linguistic diversity complicates attempts to build stable and cohe-
sive forms of political community.3
Political participation is very closely linked with the ability to com-
municate, and linguistic minorities have historically asserted the right 
to preserve their languages. Traditionally, language diversity has been 
a characteristic of multilingual societies, for instance in India, Belgium, 
and Switzerland, or countries with ethnic minorities like the Aborigi-
nes in Australia, where state-nationalism often conflicts with regional, 
ethnic, and linguistic divides. Now, with increasing immigration, a 
new kind of multilingual society is emerging, like that in the United 
States, which is poised to become the second largest country having 
Spanish speakers, as a result of increased immigration from South and 
Central America over the last few decades.
Ulrich Beck, while discussing cosmopolitanism and methodologi-
cal nationalism, writes about how society was traditionally structured 
around the state and “the state’s claim to exercise power and con-
trol was the foundation of society…National societies also generate 
and preserve in this way the quasi-essentialist identities of everyday 
life, whose self evidence seems to derive from such tautological for-
mulations as: Germans live in Germany, Japanese in Japan, Africans 
in Africa.”4 However, Beck argues that in an increasingly globalized 
world, these previous ideas about identity and nationalism are being 
rendered irrelevant or incomplete. Society based within the nation-
state is now being replaced by a World Society. Globalization not only 
challenges existing national boundaries and communities, but also 
brings into confrontation old groups, as can be witnessed in Belgium. 
The purpose of this essay is to examine how globalization has affected 
and changed ethno-linguistic nationalism and identity formation. In 
particular, I will examine this phenomenon in Belgium, increasingly 
influenced by global governance structures like the EU, and in the 
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United States, with the previously mentioned example of Spanish-
speaking communities. Secondly, this article will also examine how 
these two states have reacted to the issue and compare how the dif-
ferent approaches they employ affect identity formation in these two 
cases.
To examine how this phenomenon of ethno-linguistic nationalism 
in a globalized context is changing identity, this study will analyze 
political rhetoric and media representation to see how identity is being 
expressed and envisioned in the U.S. and Belgium with respect to the 
language issue. A significant portion of the primary sources includes 
the political positions of various parties in each country and the treat-
ment of the issue by the media. I use these media sources as represen-
tations of rhetoric on the issue of identity and the public perception of 
the question. The essay consists of the following five sections and the 
preceding introduction. First, I contextualize the issue by summarizing 
existing literature on cultural rights, language politics, and preserva-
tion of linguistic diversity. The literature is divided into four broad 
categories. Second, I analyze the history and rhetoric that surrounds 
Hispanic immigration into the United States, including specifically the 
uproar over English-only laws. Third, I examine the history of linguis-
tic diversity and regionalism in Belgium, culminating with the parlia-
mentary crisis of 2007. This section utilizes media representation and 
commentary as primary sources, as well as rhetoric emerging from 
Flemish independence movements and political parties like the Vlaams 
Belang. Fourth, I delve into the question of a unified national identity, 
given the histories of division or conflict in the two countries. Finally, I 
assess what implications this has for globalization and cosmopolitan-
ism and what lessons can be gathered.
II. Linguistic Diversity in Theoretical Context
A. In Support of Multiculturalism
In political theory over the years, language diversity has fallen under 
the rubric of multiculturalism and minority rights protection. The argu-
ment for cultural rights, as Kymlika5 describes, is based on the premise 
that traditional conceptions of nation-states are no longer valid, and 
that democracy itself is no guarantee for neutrality with respect to 
cultural practices. He argues that a democracy cannot be neutral when 
there is a diversity of languages. In its very nature, democracy will 
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favor the majority. Therefore, minority cultures and languages need 
special rights and protections.
Another argument in favor of minority language protection is the 
idea that language is not simply a means of communication, but also an 
expression of a particular culture. Els Witte and Harry van Velthoven 
write, “because of the strong symbolic value of language, language 
communities are more than a collection of those who speak the lan-
guage. Therefore, intervening in a language community is interfering 
in a cultural community in which social awareness processes are taking 
place.”6 Kymlika also argues that language is an essential part of this 
cultural category, which shapes our conception of human and individ-
ual rights themselves.7 Thus, protecting minority languages from the 
dominant language is crucial to the preservation of cultural rights.
B. Cultural Rights as Human Rights
Another approach to this issue, which overlaps in certain respects 
with the previous one, envisages the protection of cultural produc-
tion as an inherent part of the Human Rights doctrine. David Beetham 
argues that since nation-states today do not consist of homogenous 
communities, human rights that use homogeneity as a precondition 
are not appropriate. Cultural rights are necessary, then, for preventing 
“majoritism,” which is not a truly democratic system.8 The issue of 
language diversity has been absorbed within the debate surrounding 
cultural rights as human rights. Language diversity is being seen as 
a crucial issue within the realm of politics and cultural rights. This is 
because language determines the minority’s ability to meaningfully 
participate in a democracy or a government. Omid Shabani writes: 
“participation, making choices, interacting with others, and so on, hap-
pens in a language. As such, language is said to be constitutive of one’s 
political identity. From this perspective, then, there is a link between 
political life, culture, language, and identity.”9 Thus the protection of 
linguistic minorities is important from the perspective of civil and 
political human rights.
Robert Dunbar cites another reason for protection of minority lan-
guage rights, called the ecological basis, “under which linguistic diver-
sity, like bio-diversity, is valued in and of itself.”10 Within European 
law, this approach to minority language protection is affirmed through 




The opposing view on this issue criticizes the multiculturalist perspec-
tive on the grounds that it is too rooted in difference, rather than focus-
ing on what is held in common. Daniel Archibugi argues that linguistic 
diversity is not necessarily a problem for nationalism.11 He supports 
the cosmopolitan view in which one language can be adopted for the 
purpose of public communication, without necessarily undermining 
languages spoken within certain groups and language communities. 
From Archibugi’s perspective, the practical purpose of communication 
within a state served by a common language does not imply that one 
language has to be dominant politically, and appropriate structures 
need to be put in place to ensure that this does not happen. He argues:
[D]emocratic politics should imply the willingness of all players to make 
an effort to understand each other. Democratic politics depends on the 
willingness to overcome the barriers to mutual understanding, includ-
ing the linguistic ones. Anytime there is a community of fate, a democrat 
should search the available methods to allow deliberation according to 
the two key conditions of political equality and participation. If linguis-
tic diversity is an obstacle to equality and participation, some methods 
should be found to overcome it as it is exemplified by the Esperanto 
metaphor.12
Archibugi cites the examples of countries such as India, which has 
adopted a “neutral” language for the purpose of communication with 
linguistically diverse sections of its population, as a possible model for 
adopting this cosmopolitan approach to linguistic diversity. The multi-
culturalist perspective, according to Archibugi, tries to preserve diver-
sity and focuses on difference, whereas the cosmopolitan ideal aims 
at hybridization. In the most extreme sense, cosmopolitanism could 
promote the development of a world language, like Esperanto.
Another criticism of the former perspective is the disregard of the 
socioeconomic impact of language segregation in favor of the cultural 
aspect. If learning the majority language is economically beneficial 
for a particular group, then it should not be discouraged under the 
banner of protecting minority cultures.13 The cosmopolitan perspec-
tive thus opposes multiculturalism for its exclusionary tendencies, and 
promotes cross-cultural understanding in favor of preserving differ-
ence simply for the sake of difference.
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D. Authentic Nationalism Ideal
Another position on this issue that most directly confronts the previ-
ously mentioned ideas is the one espoused by writers like Samuel 
Huntington. This particular argument is especially relevant to the U.S. 
case study because it is based on the idea that countries need to protect 
their “authentic” or “original” culture and language. In his book, Who 
are We?, and article, “The Hispanic Challenge,” Huntington writes 
specifically about immigration to the United States and challenges to 
(what he claims is) the authentic American identity. Huntington makes 
the argument that the United States was founded on Anglo-Protestant 
principles and the English language played a crucial role in creating 
and developing what America stands for today. He argues that this 
“Americanism” needs to be preserved against influences coming from 
immigrants who are not assimilating into mainstream American soci-
ety, unlike immigrants of the past.14
III. The English-Spanish Debate in the United States
At the same time as Mitt Romney, during his campaign for the Repub-
lican nomination for President of the United States, was making prom-
ises to further English-only legislation, his campaign was running 
advertisements in Spanish in an attempt to woo Hispanic-American 
voters. With the exception of a few candidates, presidential hopefuls in 
2007 participated in the Spanish debate on the channel Univision, and 
Democrats Bill Richardson and Chris Dodd are both fluent in Span-
ish.15 This was the case during an election in which immigration had 
become an important electoral issue, and the policy of making English 
the official language in the United States became a proxy for rhetoric 
on immigration.16
A. English-Only Laws in U.S. Politics
Deborah Schildkraut describes how, over the last four decades, the 
ethno-linguistic make-up of the United States has changed significantly, 
mostly as a result of immigration from Central and South America.17 
The issue of integrating or assimilating immigrants into “American” 
society has become an often debated and contested topic. This debate 
has now evolved from a question of integrating immigrants to how 
they are challenging “Americanism” and American identity, as the U.S. 
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is set to become the country with the second largest Spanish-speaking 
population.18 This discussion of linguistic diversity, often charged with 
underlying xenophobia, has since the 1980s resulted in English-only 
legislation in twenty-six states and a consideration of similar propos-
als in many others: “Before 1980 only three states, Nebraska, Illinois 
and Virginia, had declared English their sole ‘official language.’ By 
1988, however, only three states, Maine, Vermont and Alaska, had not 
considered ‘official English’ laws.”19 This move toward English-only 
laws is motivated by an image of immigrants as stuck in “ghettos,” 
where there is no pressure or need to learn the language of the major-
ity. The position in favor of English-only laws sees this as a question of 
preserving an American national identity, which is being threatened 
by immigrants. On the other hand, proponents of bilingual education 
and preservation of Spanish cite its cultural importance to Hispanic 
groups, as well as practical hardships that might be a consequence of 
an English-only policy, as reasons for their position.
B. The Question of American Identity
Just as these two positions are divided in their policy prescriptions, 
they also view the history of integration of immigrants differently. To 
prove his thesis that due to non-assimilation Hispanic immigration 
poses a radically new threat to American identity, Huntington makes 
the argument that the United States was founded in Anglo-Protestant 
tradition, and previous immigrants to the U.S. immediately absorbed 
this ideal. His main contention is that immigration in the last few 
decades is vastly different from previous waves because of its magni-
tude, the different income and education levels in the migrant groups, 
and finally, in their lack of desire to adopt the Anglo-Protestant tradi-
tion, which is most clear on the issue of learning English.20 Jack Citrin 
et al. discuss this view of American identity concerned with language 
and write:
Proponents of ‘English-only’ contend that both historical experience and 
common sense teach that linguistic diversity threatens political cohesion 
and stability. Previous generations of immigrants understood that learn-
ing English was the vehicle of social integration and economic mobil-
ity, the ‘agent’ that caused people of widely different origins to ‘melt’ 
into Americans. To abandon the status of English as America’s common 
tongue is, therefore, to risk a Tower of Babel, and undermine one of the 
last things that still holds this pluralistic society together.21
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Huntington goes on to argue that this American national identity 
is now being challenged by globalization in the form of dual, transna-
tional, and cosmopolitan identities:
In the final decades of the 20th Century however the United States’ 
Anglo-Protestant culture and the creed that it produced came under 
assault by the popularity in intellectual and political circles of the doc-
trines of multiculturalism and diversity; the rise of group identities 
based on race, ethnicity, and gender over national identity; the impact 
of transnational diasporas; the expanding number of immigrants with 
dual nationalities and dual loyalties; and the growing salience for U.S. 
intellectual, business and political elites of cosmopolitan and transna-
tional identities. The United States’ national identity, like that of other 
nation-states, is challenged by the forces of globalization as well as the 
needs that globalization produces among people for smaller and more 
meaningful ‘blood and belief’ identities.22
On the other hand, the critics of his position argue for a more mul-
ticulturist perspective, or alternatively focus on the practical aspects of 
the issue, for instance, problems immigrants might face if they do not 
understand English and have to deal with a health emergency when 
the forms are only available in English. Another point raised in opposi-
tion to restrictive language laws is the idea that American identity is 
based on immigration and diversity, and language is seen simply as 
another form of this diversity and thus should be protected. Critics of 
Huntington’s position make the argument that he over-romanticizes 
assimilation in the previous generations of immigrants. Further, the 
fact that Hispanic immigrants in the first generation do not speak Eng-
lish is not reflective of a desire to not become “American,” but rather a 
consequence of other factors.23
C. English Acquisition in Hispanic Communities
The bone of contention for groups that advocate “official English” poli-
cies is the idea that Hispanic immigrants deliberately choose to segre-
gate themselves from the rest of the population and this is manifested 
in their supposed desire not to learn English. This argument, however, 
ignores some basic socioeconomic realities that play a much greater 
role in a migrant’s ability to integrate than intent or desire.24 The facts 
suggest that second-generation and third-generation immigrants with 
Hispanic backgrounds are learning English at the same rate as other 
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immigrant groups have in the past. The general trend when it comes to 
the acquisition of English among migrants is that (unless they are from 
an English-speaking country) first-generation immigrants tend to have 
limited fluency in English, and their children, embarrassed by this fact, 
often abandon the native language of their parents. Thus, fluency in 
the first language of immigrant communities would often end.25 The 
crucial difference between previous and current waves of immigra-
tion is that the rate of retention of Spanish in successive generations 
is higher. This can be attributed to the fact that there appears to be a 
greater sense of pride in Spanish among the community.26 In addition, 
Huntington’s critique of multiculturalism with respect to language 
also overlooks the fact that for a lot of first-generation immigrants it is 
nearly impossible to learn English, due to lack of funds, previous lack 
of access to education, and current excessive working hours.27 Often 
first-generation Hispanic immigrants work with other immigrants of 
similar backgrounds, at minimum wage, and are thus unable to afford 
the cost of learning English. At the same time, statistics suggest that 
the demand for English as a Second Language classes often exceeds 
the supply.28
The same fears expressed by Huntington about Hispanic immigra-
tion were earlier expressed about German, Italian, and Irish immi-
grants.29 The idea that “Americanism” is exclusively associated with 
Anglo-Protestant tradition excludes all positive contributions that suc-
cessive waves of immigration have made to the United States. Political 
rhetoric, when it supports the cause of immigrants, absorbs the idea 
of the “melting pot” and projects the image of the United States as a 
nation of immigrants, an idea that Huntington rejects.
Another argument raised against English-only laws is what this 
implies for the many languages spoken by Native-American popula-
tions. The focus on English-only laws relegates these populations into 
a secondary status since their language becomes dispensable. Thus, 
this new wave of migration and specifically the question of having an 
official language is challenging and re-envisioning American identity. 
Now, due to the magnitude of immigration into the U.S., non-native 
speakers are either voluntarily or through encouragement learning 
English. Globalization, through migration, is resulting within the U.S. 
in two opposing forces. One position supports a more cosmopoli-
tan view of the issue, with attempts to move beyond strict notions of 
Americanism and bring into the American fold new cultural features. 
The other side of the debate, often playing on xenophobic sentiments, 
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paints migrants as threats to their “authentic” ideas of American iden-
tity. In the U.S., language has become the issue that is being used to 
symbolize this conflict of identities.
IV. Flemish and French Nationalism in Belgium
A. History of Belgian Language Policy
In December 2006, a French-language television station broke the story 
of the secession of Flanders, the Flemish-speaking northern part of the 
country, from the rest of Belgium. The program, “Bye Bye Belgium,” 
was inspired by Orson Welles’ 1938 hoax broadcast announcing the 
invasion of Earth from Mars. The joke, however, did not sit well with 
most of the audience, where nine out of ten people believed it and 
flooded the television channel’s switchboard.30 This television hoax 
exemplifies in many ways the current political climate in Belgium. Com-
mentators, politicians, and the Belgian people themselves often predict 
the inevitable breakup of Belgium. Thus, the fact that such a large
number of viewers believed this story is not completely surprising.
In terms of language diversity and politics, Belgium is not partic-
ularly unique because, in fact, linguistically homogenous states are 
rare. Belgium has experienced throughout its history various political 
experiments in order to come up with a viable system for its linguisti-
cally diverse populations.31 This history of reform makes for an impor-
tant case in the field of language politics. The focus in this section is the 
recent crisis in the Belgian Federal Government after the 2007 elections, 
which was resolved in March 2008. The media had predicted possi-
bilities of a break-up of the state, since no consensus could be reached 
between the different language groups in electing a federal govern-
ment after there was no clear winner in the parliamentary elections.
From its very inception Belgium has been a linguistically divided 
country that was created, in 1831, as a buffer between the Germanic 
north and the Latin south regions of Europe. Belgium consisted of the 
northern Flemish-speaking population and the southern French speak-
ers. Initially, French was the language of the elites in Belgium, not just 
in Walloon but also in Flanders. For years, populations monolingual in 
Flemish were economically and politically oppressed. Economically, 
Walloon remained the most important sector of the Belgian economy 
due to the heavy concentration of industries. This was the case for 
most of the first half of the twentieth century. Until 1932 it was not pos-
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sible to study in Flemish at a Belgian university. It wasn’t until 1970, 
when Belgium became increasingly federalized and power was given 
to regional governments, that Flanders gained equal footing in politi-
cal matters.32
Due to the shift in economic situations, when the coalmines in Wal-
loon lost their importance, French has for the most part lost its status 
as an elite language. In fact, it has experienced a backlash from Flan-
ders against what was perceived as francophone hegemony. In the 
years when French reigned supreme, the Walloon population made no 
attempt to learn Flemish, while the Flemish speakers were expected 
to master French. As industries in the south lost their economic value 
and Flanders became the region of economic prosperity in Belgium, 
Walloon has become politically expendable and the prestige of the lan-
guage and culture has also diminished.33
B. Current Political Climate
Since the democratization in the middle of the twentieth century, six 
separate regional governments were established within Belgium: in 
Walloon, Flanders, Brussels, and further for the three main language 
groups Flemish, French and German. These regional governments con-
trolled most of the responsibilities of the state. The regional govern-
ment of Flanders and the Flemish language parliament have actually 
merged into one government. French speakers can only vote for politi-
cians from Walloon and Flemish speakers can only vote for other Flan-
ders natives. Even in Brussels, which is technically bilingual, French 
speakers may only vote for fellow French speakers. This strictly federal 
and divided electoral system has come to be considered the most fea-
sible solution to Belgium’s dilemma in dealing with its diverse commu-
nities.34 In addition to the regional governments there exists a central 
federal government, which has handed over a significant amount of 
control and power to the various regions.
There have been critics as well as proponents of language rights 
with respect to the Flemish speakers. The proponents view the issue as 
a need to protect Flemish heritage from francophone hegemony. The 
critics mostly oppose the manner in which these language rights have 
been fought for, and specifically the insistence on constructing nation-
alism through this point of difference, rather than the more cosmopoli-
tan view that Archibugi adopts.35 For instance, to reassert Flemish as 
an important language in the Belgian context, it has been standardized 
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to resemble Dutch, rather than using traditional Flemish. In effect, 
Belgium consists of two distinct and often antagonistic cultural and 
linguistic communities.36 The divisions undermine any national Bel-
gian identity that might exist and have led commentators to question 
whether there is any such thing as a truly and completely Belgian per-
son.37
C. Pro-Flemish Nationalists Position
Flemish independence movements in Belgium point out that under 
the new EU regime, Belgium as a nation-state does not really exist 
anymore. In other words, there is no Belgian nationality or identity in 
this highly federalized environment.37 Over the years, unemployment 
rose in Walloon, and Flanders became rich. The floundering Walloon 
economy has increased desire for secession in Flanders, which contains 
the majority of the nation’s population. Walloon is often portrayed in 
Flanders as a drain on the Belgian economy, and many believe that the 
Flemish population is subsidizing Walloon’s economy. Vlaams Belang 
is a right-wing, pro-Flemish independence party that has supported 
this image of Flanders as an independent state.38 The economic aspects 
of the language divide in Belgium have also affected the representation 
of each side by the other. In the media and by politicians on both sides, 
images of Walloon and Flanders are promoted that seek to maintain 
a division between the two groups. Due to the economic status of 
the region, people from Walloon are often caricatured as being lazy, 
arrogant drains on the resources of the northern part of the country. 
At the same time, due to the election of various moderate-to-conserva-
tive politicians in Flanders, the Flemish have often been represented in 
Walloon as right wing, closed-minded, and bigoted.39
It has been argued that the division between the two groups is 
perhaps the only thing characteristically Belgian. Politicians, writers, 
commentators, and others have reasserted the fact that there is no 
such thing as a Belgian identity: “Flanders tends to vote right. Wal-
lonia left. The two societies have different school systems, watch dif-
ferent television and theatre, sing different versions of the national 
anthem.”40 Flemish poet, Leonard Nolens, said about the question of 
Belgian identity, “I was born in Belgium, but Belgium was never born 
in me.” The inability to find nationalism and a common identity has 
been the subject of amusement for commentators and writers writing 
about Belgium. Van Den Braembussche writes, “The uneasiness that 
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comes with being Belgian stems from two longstanding problems. The 
first proceeds from the perception that Belgium is an artificial construc-
tion, a nation made up of at least two different peoples and always on 
the edge of breaking up into its linguistic communities.”41
D. The Role of the European Union
As one of the founding members of the European Union, and with 
Brussels being the seat of countless European Parliament activities, 
Belgium is physically and metaphorically being changed by politics 
at the European level. Under the European Human Rights Law and 
the Minority Languages Charter, Europe has granted to the minorities 
within its member states a myriad of rights. Often membership is only 
granted when states are seen as providing protection for the minori-
ties in their own countries.42 For countries such as Belgium and Spain, 
which already have highly federalized government structures in place 
to protect the different cultural or lingual groups within their popula-
tion, the growing power of the EU has resulted in a crisis of power for 
their central governments.
With the rise of the EU, Belgians are now looking outward for an 
overarching political establishment. One consequence of globalization 
for Belgium is the fact that Belgians on either side of the divide are 
now more reluctant than ever to learn the other side’s language, and 
English, the global lingua franca, has become the second language of 
choice for most Belgians.43 Furthermore, politicians who favor a divi-
sion of the country argue that between the regional governments and 
a large number of responsibilities being transferred to the EU, the Bel-
gian federal government is no longer of any value. At the same time, 
the presence of the EU is giving Belgium a new identity to unite under, 
and, in the form of English, a language for communication.44
In terms of European politics, globalization undeniably is calling 
into question previous ideas about nationhood as theorists, politicians, 
and citizens search for a unified European identity. A part of this shift 
in defining identity also affects how old conflicts are understood in 
this new era. In Belgium, Europe could, and to a certain extent already 
has, become a source for a new identity that simultaneously pulls the 
different factions in Belgium apart, but also unites them under the ban-
ner of Europe.
Macalester International  Vol. 22
240
E. Parliamentary Crisis of 2007
Since Belgium’s electoral system was reformed, for thirty years the 
Federal government has been dominated by moderate Flemish politi-
cians, as Flemish speakers make up almost sixty percent of the Belgian 
population. In the 2007 election, however, no single party managed to 
win the election outright and no compromise could be reached.45 The 
crisis brought to the fore Belgium’s now 177-year struggle with keep-
ing its two halves united, given increasing demands from the Flemish 
side for an even greater federalization of powers. During the crisis 
many political commentators asserted that Belgium was on the brink 
of breaking up, as the country had no federal government in place for 
more than 250 days.46
Given the highly federalized nature of the state in Belgium and 
increasing power in the hands of the EU, on the surface it might appear 
that the Belgian federal government has lost its value, and thus the 
question of secession seems inevitable. Despite these events and politi-
cal positions, according to recent polls seventy-two percent of all Bel-
gians support a unified Belgian state, and a majority of the Flemish 
population also opposes secession.47 The majority of the population 
still might not favor a common language for the purpose of communi-
cation, but it does support the idea of a common state. Even if its actual 
powers might be limited, the symbolic value of such a unified state is 
significant.
V. Conclusions
A. The Possibilities for National Identities
In Belgium, years of battle over a viable language policy has led to the 
formation of a highly federalized state, and in the U.S., there is cur-
rently polarization on the issue of language, with one political party 
trying to attract potential Hispanic voters and the other bringing Eng-
lish-only laws to the table. With the increased presence of the EU, it has 
been argued by certain politicians that a unified Belgian state does not 
exist in practice, due to an increasingly weakened federal government. 
However, the majority of the population still seems to be holding on 
to an idea of a unified Belgian identity. Thus even in Belgium, despite 
the electoral crisis and the fractured and divisive identity politics, the 
majority still espouses, or at least prefers, a more cosmopolitan view 
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on the issue of linguistic diversity. While there is no common language 
of communication between Flanders and Walloon, this does not seem 
to be an insurmountable obstacle for the continuation of the state, 
though it obviously presents some problems.
In the United States, globalization as represented by immigration 
has exposed divisions in terms of how different groups define nation-
alism and an “American” identity. Amartya Sen writes that often the-
orists and commentators on the issue assume that there is a single 
source of identity for every human being, and ignore the plurality 
of identity. He calls this the “illusion of destiny.”48 He writes: “Civi-
lization or religious partitioning of the world population leads to a 
‘solitarist’ approach to human identity, which sees human beings as 
members of exactly one group…A solitarist approach can be a good 
way of misunderstanding nearly everyone in the world.”49 Thus, Sen is 
critical of any debate on identity that essentializes human beings into 
categories depending on only one factor. Using Anglo-Protestantism 
as the basis for American identity, Samuel Huntington would be com-
mitting this folly. Acknowledging that there are multiple contributions 
and sources that play a role in the formation of an American identity 
can become one way of adopting this cosmopolitan outlook. Hunting-
ton sees transnational identities as a hindrance to a supreme national 
identity, but a transnational and cosmopolitan outlook can overcome 
the antagonisms that characterize the current discussion on language 
in the United States.
B. Lessons about Globalization and Cosmopolitanism
The Belgian and American cases exemplify how globalizing forces are 
not necessarily cosmopolitan or ethnically restrictive. Depending on 
the politics of the day, nationalist sentiment can be manipulated into 
support for either deep ethnic divides or a more cosmopolitan narra-
tive with the possibility of compromise. This idea of a cosmopolitan 
disposition is also explained by Tomlinson, who argues that cosmopol-
itanism is a worldview that acknowledges the “need to have a sense of 
wider cultural commitment—of belonging to the world as a whole.”50 
The idea of belonging to the world as a whole restricts the space for 
cultural difference. This does not mean that there are no local differ-
ences. Rather, with a cosmopolitan outlook, human beings can move 
away from these differences and focus on creating and sustaining a 
world community.
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Tomlinson defines cosmopolitanism as extending moral commit-
ment and solidarity beyond local contexts. The issue of language in the 
United States and Belgium shows that this idea is not applicable sim-
ply beyond national and continental borders, but also within nations. 
In fact, Belgium can be seen as an example for the EU and the rest 
of the world of a country that—despite its sources of difference and 
antagonisms—can remain a unified state, and that cultural difference 
does not have to become a hindrance to cross-cultural understanding. 
In the United States, restrictive views of nationalism on either side can 
prevent this sort of cross-cultural understanding. Tomlinson argues 
that in order to adopt a cosmopolitan ideal we have to “cease thinking 
in terms of antagonistic binary oppositions and try to think about the 
cosmopolitan disposition as something that does not have to exclude 
the perspective of the local.”51 In Belgium, despite rhetoric on both 
sides that views Flanders and Walloon as two distinct communities 
pitted against each other, there is the possibility of reconciliation and 
cooperation, and the presence of the EU allows for a shift from these 
binary oppositions. The interconnectedness with the rest of the world 
that we experience as a result of economics and technology cannot 
be reversed. Consequently, we are forced to operate with the knowl-
edge that culture and identity cannot be fixed in space and time. This 
knowledge has an emancipatory power that can be used to resolve or 
at least move past cultural difference. Belgium has experienced this 
shift to a certain extent. Belgium has stayed unified despite its cultural 
differences, and this is a form of the cosmopolitan viewpoint.
In both these cases, the forces of globalization are exposing scars of 
conflict and division. The EU in Belgium can be seen as one reason for 
the cleavage of ties with the Belgian identity. In the U.S., the presence 
of immigrants with a supposedly different culture is leading to divi-
sions on the question of what American identity is. At the same time, 
both of these cases also provide the opportunity for the development 
of a cosmopolitan ideal that Archibugi mentions. Belgium is often seen 
as a country deeply divided and on the brink of falling apart. Yet 
Belgium also offers lessons on how cultural difference can be accom-
modated within a national community. There might not be a tangi-
ble, strict, and nuanced conception of a Belgian national identity, but 
acknowledging the plurality of all identities and moving away from 
cultural antagonisms allow for a mutual coexistence and understand-
ing. In the United States, instead of searching for true “Americanism,” 
the conception of identity as a malleable and dynamic concept can 
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reduce the antagonisms that emerge in the current debate. This new 
wave of immigration, rather than being perceived as a threat, can be 
seen as an opportunity to further cross-cultural understanding and cri-
tique. Thus, both of these cases show that globalization, in and of itself, 
cannot be thought of as simply divisive, nor can it be thought of as a 
panacea for global harmony. It is, however, a cosmopolitan disposition 
that allows us to negotiate past local differences and build a common 
identity despite cultural discontinuity. •
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